Each person in a set of even cardinality n ranks the others in order of preference. A matching is a partition of the set into n 2 pairs. A matching is called stable if no two persons (who are not paired) both prefer each other to their actual partners.
for person from 1 to N do { proposer = person repeat { proposer proposes to the next candidate in his list if proposer is not rejected then { candidate's favorite = proposer proposer = candidate's previous favorite } } until proposer is empty or no more candidates in the list } Example 1 4 6 2 5 3 2 6 3 5 1 4 3 4 5 1 6 2 4 2 6 5 1 3 5 4 2 3 6 1 6 5 1 4 2 3 1 → 4; 4's favorite is 1 2 → 6; 6's favorite is 2 3 → 4; 4 rejects 3 → 5; 5's favorite is 3 4 → 2; 2's favorite is 4 5 → 4; 4's favorite is 5; rejects 1 1 → 6; 6's favorite is 1; rejects 2 2 → 3; 3's favorite is 2 6 → 5; 5 rejects 6 → 1; 1's favorite is 6
If after the first phase there is a person rejected by everyone, then there is no stable matching. Otherwise each person has a favorite, and we can reduce the Expected number of stable matchings.
Assume you have a random ranking matrix. How many stable matchings are there? Suprisingly, we can reduce this combinatorial problem to calculus. First, let us describe how we will generate random ranks. More specificly, for any person we need to generate a random permunation. In order to do this, we will generate n 2 real random values X ij ← U [0, 1]. Then for any fixed person i consider all X ij except for X ii and order numbers 1, 2, . . . , i − 1, i + 1, . . . , n with respect to order of X ij . For example, for person 3, if X 31 = .43, X 32 = .985, X 34 = .1, X 35 = .17, then the ordered sequence will be X 34 , X 35 , X 31 , X 32 , which gives us permutation 4, 5, 1, 2, and these numbers will be ranks for person 3. One can check that the resulting distribution of permutations is uniform. Now let us call the matching to be standard (and denote as M 0 ), if each person i is paired with i+ n 2 . What is the probability that this matching is stable? Let us denote the event
Now recall how we defined our ranks. Pair (i, j) is an instability if i likes j more than his partner i + n 2 , and the same holds for j. This means that A ij = {X ij < X i,i+ n 2 , X ji < X j,j+ n 2 }. Let's calculate the conditional probability: P r(A ij |X α,α+ n 2 = x α , α = 1, . . . , n) = x i x j (here X ij are random variables and x i are numbers). Recall that {M 0 is stable } =
We need one more step: this is the probability only for M 0 to be stable. But due to symmetry, the same holds for any matching. Since there are (n − 1)!! = (n − 1)(n − 3) · . . . · 5 · 3 · 1 different matchings in a graph, the expected number of stable matchings
With calculus it can be shown that lim n→∞ E[S n ] = e 1 2 .
